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We posit that compared to the cognitive system, the affective system of judgment and decision 
making is relatively more engaged in the present. Specifically, we hypothesize that even if their 
accessibility is held constant, affective feelings are weighted more heavily in consumer 
judgments and decisions set in the present than in equivalent judgments and decisions set in the 
future or in the past. Consistent with this proposition, results from six experiments show that (a) 
compared to a more distant future, a nearer future increases consumers’ relative preferences for 
options that are superior in terms of integral affect over options that are cognitively superior; (b) 
compared to a more distant future, a nearer future also increases the influence of incidental 
moods on consumers’ evaluation; (c) consumers find the reliance on feelings more “natural” in 
decisions set in a nearer future than in decisions set in a more distant future; and (d) compared to 
a more distant past, a more recent past also increases the influence of incidental moods on 
consumers’ evaluations. 
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Consumer judgments and decisions can be made either in a more cognitive, reason-based 
manner—by assessing, weighing, and combining attribute information into an overall evaluative 
judgment—or in a more affective, feeling-based manner, by inspecting one’s momentary 
feelings toward the options (Pham 1998; Schwarz and Clore 1996). An emerging body of 
evidence suggests that the two modes of judgment and decision making may tap into two 
separate systems: (a) a reason-based, analytical system and (b) a feeling-based, affective system 
(Epstein and Pacini 1999; Strack and Deutsch 2004). Whereas the judgment characteristics of the 
reason-based system are relatively well established and understood (Bettman, Luce, and Payne 
1998), a growing body of research has focused on clarifying the distinctive judgment 
characteristics of the affective system (Hsee and Rottenstreich 2004; Pham 2007; Ratner and 
Herbst 2005; Slovic et al. 2002). One issue that has received relatively little attention are the 
conditions under which the affective system (as opposed to the reason-based system) is more 
likely to be engaged. The present research speaks to this issue.  
This research suggests that everything else equal, the affective, feeling-based system is 
more likely to be engaged in judgments and decisions that are set in the present than in similar 
judgments and decisions that are set in the future or in the past. This broad proposition 
generalizes the established finding that compared to reason-based decisions, affect-based 
decisions tend to be more myopic (Ariely and Loewenstein 2006; Loewenstein 1996; Metcalfe 
and Mischel 1999). Specifically, previous explanations of this myopia have focused on the 
differential accessibility of affective/emotional feelings that are experienced in the present 
compared to those that are anticipated in the future. Because the immediate feelings that one 
experiences in relation to a present stimulus are more accessible and intense than those that one 
can only imagine in relation to a future state of the world, the reliance on feelings in judgments 
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and decisions steers preferences toward myopic options that are immediately rewarding 
compared to farsighted options that are superior in the long run (Loewenstein 1996; Loewenstein 
et al. 2001; Metcalfe and Mischel 1999; Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez 1989; Shiv and 
Fedorikhin 1999). 
Although we agree that the differential accessibility of feelings is a major contributor to 
the myopic tendencies of affect-based decisions, we suggest that this phenomenon is only one 
facet of a more general property of the affective system. We propose that the affective system is, 
in fact, inherently a decision-making system of the present (Pham 2004, 2007). This proposition 
is derived from the rationale that as a remnant of our distant evolutionary past (Epstein 1994; 
Lieberman et al. 2002), the affective system was originally meant to guide behavioral choices 
that our ancestors faced in their immediate (i.e., present) environment (Cosmides and Tooby 
2000, Pham 2007). We believe that because of its original emphasis on immediate behavioral 
choices, the affective system has retained a distinctive orientation toward the present. This 
orientation includes that current feelings are typically more accessible and intense than more 
temporally distant feelings but also implies other facets beyond this. Our general thesis is thus 
that the entire affective system of decision making is more likely to be engaged in judgments and 
decisions that are set in the present than in similar judgments and decisions that are set in a more 
distant time, whether in the future or in the past.  
As an initial test of this general proposition, the present set of studies tests the more 
specific hypothesis that even when the intensity and accessibility of feelings are held constant, 
affective feelings are weighted more heavily in consumers’ judgments and decisions that are set 
in the present than in equivalent judgments and decisions that are set in the future or in the past. 
In other words, even if feelings associated with present options and feelings associated with 
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future (or past) options were equally accessible and intense, consumers would still be more likely 
to rely on their feelings when evaluating options whose time frame is closer to the present than 
when evaluating options whose time frame is more distant. This hypothesis was tested in six 
consumer decision-making experiments spanning three different decision domains (apartment 
rentals, video games, and evaluations of past vacations) and involving two different types of 
manipulations of affect: manipulations of integral affective feelings toward the options and 
manipulations of participants’ incidental mood states (Bodenhausen 1993). 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
As a starting point, we review literature that provides empirical and theoretical bases for 
the present hypothesis. First, we review literature on time and decisions, including impulsivity, 
self-control, and delay of gratification. Next, we review literature on dual-system models. 
 
Impulsivity, Self-Control, and Delay of Gratification 
 
A substantial body of empirical evidence has shown that consumers are impatient and 
prefer options that offer immediate gratification over options that have superior outcomes in the 
future (Ainslie 1975; Mischel 1974; Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez 1989). Although consumers 
make well-reasoned choices when outcomes are distant, they become more likely to impulsively 
switch from their earlier, prudent choices as time gets closer to the receipt of the earlier reward. 
Various models have been proposed to capture this pattern of consumer myopia in choice 
situations across time, but less is known about the psychological mechanism driving this 
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behavior. A general assumption is that the value of outcomes is discounted as temporal distance 
from the outcomes increases (Ainslie 1975; Mischel 1974; Mischel et al. 1989; Trope and 
Liberman 2000, 2003).  
One major stream of research in psychology that examines changes in value of outcome 
over time is Mischel’s delay-of-gratification paradigm. Mischel and his colleagues investigated 
an important feature of self-control: postponing immediate gratification to attain delayed but 
overall more valuable outcomes (Mischel 1974; Mischel et al. 1989). Research in this area 
typically distinguishes the type of value of the outcomes between affect-based and cognitive-
based values (Loewenstein 1996; Metcalfe and Mischel 1999; Mischel et al. 1989). Compared to 
cognitive-based values, affect-based values in the choice situation are assumed to be discounted 
much more steeply over time, making the influence of cognitive values more pronounced over 
time. For example, in deciding whether to consume a luscious chocolate dessert immediately, the 
tastiness of the dessert (its affect-based value) may prevail over its unhealthy consequences (its 
cognitive value). However, if the choice is delayed for a month, the unhealthy consequences of 
the desert will tend to outweigh its tastiness. Therefore, compared to reason-based decisions, 
affect-based decisions tend to be myopic and focused on the present.  
A primary explanation for consumer impatience and myopia is that experienced affective 
responses to options whose outcomes are immediately accessible are typically more intense than 
anticipated affective responses to options whose outcomes are set in the future (Loewenstein 
1996). For example, the thrill of an extra glass of whiskey while sitting at a bar with a friend is 
usually more intense than the anticipated regret of having drunk too much when waking up the 
day after. Similarly, among sedentary people, the pain of running several miles is usually more 
accessible than the anticipated pleasure of having done so afterward. As a result, a reliance on 
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feelings in judgments and decisions tends to skew preference toward myopic choices. Therefore 
a key explanation for people’s myopic choices and their inability to exert self-control and delay 
gratification lies in the differential accessibility of current and delayed affective reactions (Shiv 
and Fedorikhin 1999). 
Although we agree that the differential accessibility of feelings across time orientation is 
an important driver of the myopic tendencies of affect-based decisions, we believe that this 
phenomenon is only one facet of a more general property of the affective system. We propose 
that the affective system is inherently a decision-making system of the present (Pham 2004, 
2007); that is, even if the accessibility and intensity of feelings were to be held constant across 
time frames, consumers would still rely more on their feelings in decisions set in the present than 
in decisions set in the future or decisions set in the past. This general thesis can be derived from 
the evolutionary and processing characteristics of the affective, feeling-based system of 
judgment in relation to the cognitive, reason-based system.  
 
Dual-System Models 
 
A number of dual-system models of reasoning and judgment have been proposed in 
recent years, including Epstein’s (1994) cognitive-experiential self-theory, Sloman’s (1996) two 
systems of reasoning, Stanovich and West’s (2000) dual-system model of individual differences,  
Kahneman and Frederick’s (2002, 2005) dual-system model, and Strack and Deutsch’s (2004) 
reflective-impulsive model. Although there are subtle differences among these various dual-
system models (Stanovich and West 2000), they typically posit the existence of two systems: one 
that is primarily affective and feeling based and another that is primarily cognitive and reason 
 9 
based. These two systems are further characterized by different evolutionary and processing 
properties (Dijksterhuis and Nordgren 2006; Epstein 1994; Evans 1984, 2006; Kahneman and 
Frederick 2002, 2005; Lieberman et al. 2002; Sloman 1996; Smith and DeCoster 2000; 
Stanovich and West 2000; Strack and Deutsch 2004). For example, most dual-system models 
assume that the affective, feeling-based system lies in a phylogenetically primitive part of the 
brain, whereas the cognitive, reason-based system is a more recent development and uniquely 
human (Lieberman et al. 2002; Metcalfe and Mischel 1999; Smith and DeCoster 2000). 
Compared to the reason-based system, the feeling-based system is additionally assumed to 
process information in an automatic, quick, and contextualized manner (Epstein 1994; 
Kahneman and Frederick 2002; Sloman 1996; Smith and DeCoster 2000; Stanovich and West 
2000). Recent work in the consumer behavior literature has also started to examine the 
distinction between the two systems and their effects on evaluations and choices (Lee, Amir, and 
Ariely 2009; Pham et al. 2001; Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999). For instance, Pham et al. (2001) have 
found that feeling-based judgments, as compared to reason-based assessments, tend to respond 
more rapidly and consistently.  
The different evolutionary properties and processing characteristics of the two systems 
suggest that judgments and decisions set in the present tend to preferentially activate the 
affective system. From an evolutionary perspective, the human mind consists of a set of 
programs that were designed by natural selection to help our ancestors solve adaptive problems 
(Cosmides and Tooby 2003). The affective system resides in phylogenetically ancient areas of 
the brain (e.g., the limbic area) and exhibits substantial commonalities between humans and 
animals (Epstein 1994; Lieberman et al. 2002). It is acquired by biology or genes over 
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generations, repeated exposure to the environment, and personal experiences (Epstein 1994; 
Stanovich and West 2000).  
Over the course of evolutionary history, the affective system has guided our ancestors 
through choices they have faced in their immediate, present environments (Cosmides and Tooby 
2000; Pham 2007). Emotions, as programs of the affective system, are designed to help us cope 
and function adaptively with recurring ancestral situations: identifying valuable opportunities 
worthy of pursuit and signaling dangerous threats to which the wrong responses would diminish 
fitness in the environment (Clore, Gasper, and Garvin 2001; Tooby and Cosmides 1990). When 
confronted by a stimulus, emotions help us determine whether an approach or withdrawal 
response is functionally adaptive. The affective system is a system that “has been sculpted by the 
hammer and chisel of adaptation and natural selection to differentiate hostile from hospitable 
stimuli and to respond accordingly. . . . Affective categorizations and responses are so critical 
that all enduring species have rudimentary reflexes for categorizing and approaching or 
withdrawing from certain classes of stimuli” (Cacioppo, Gardner, and Berntson 1999, 839). The 
affective system is critically designed to help us deal with the present environment. Relative to 
the affective system, the cognitive system is suggested to be a more evolutionarily recent 
development and uniquely human (Evans 2006).  
The evolutionary past of the two systems is reflected in how the two systems operate and 
influence behavior. One example comes from how the systems construe the environment. The 
affective system tends to process information in a contextualized manner in which concepts are 
represented in a set of features learned from past exposure, and the cognitive system tends to be 
decontextualized. This feature of the cognitive system allows people to abstract away from their 
surrounding environments and engage in abstract, hypothetical thinking, constructing mental 
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simulations of future possibilities that are helpful in planning (Evans 2006; Pham 2004). Thus 
the cognitive system allows people to generate time perspectives (Strack and Deutsch 2004). 
Other research has suggested that animals may be “stuck in time,” unable to remember past 
events or predict future events (Roberts 2002), perhaps because animals lack the development of 
the cognitive system. In summary, evolutionary and processing characteristics of the two systems 
suggest that the design of the affective system is skewed toward the present orientation, whereas 
the cognitive system is atemporal and thus has a relatively greater influence on distant times. 
This notion is also consistent with evidence from research in neuroscience (see McClure et al. 
2004). In a functional magnetic resonance imaging study of intertemporal choice, McClure et al. 
found that areas of the brain commonly associated with affective processes show greater activity 
when an intertemporal choice includes an immediate reward than a delayed reward (exhibiting a 
bias to immediacy), but areas of the brain associated with deliberate cognitive processes respond 
to all intertemporal choices equally. 
We therefore propose that because of its original evolutionary emphasis on behavioral 
choices faced in the immediate, present environment (Epstein 1994; Lieberman et al. 2002), the 
affective system has retained a distinctive orientation toward the present (Pham 2004, 2007). As 
a result, the entire affective system of decision making is more likely to be engaged in judgments 
and decisions that are set in the present than in comparable judgments and decisions that are set 
in a more distant time, whether in the future or in the past. One prominent—and already well 
documented—facet of this proposition is the previously mentioned finding that affective feelings 
that are associated with present options and outcomes are typically more accessible and intense 
than those associated with options and outcomes that are more temporally distant. However, the 
general proposition that the affective system is inherently anchored in the present yields 
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additional predictions. Once the affective system is activated, affective feelings (including 
moods and emotions) should be more likely to be relied on as a source of information in 
judgments and decision making. Thus, as an initial test of our general proposition, the present 
research tests the more specific hypothesis that even when their accessibility or intensity is held 
constant, affective feelings are weighted more heavily in consumers’ judgments and decisions 
that are set in the present than in equivalent judgments and decisions that are set in the future or 
in the past. 
Indirect support for the general position that the affective system may be inherently 
anchored in the present comes from several findings indicating a close association between 
affective feelings and an orientation toward the present (Li 2008; Van Boven et al. 2007; Van 
Boven, White, and Huber 2009; Van den Bergh, Dewitte, and Warlop 2008). Van Boven et al. 
(2009) recently observed that immediate emotions were judged to be more intense compared to 
temporally distant emotions, even when the actual intensity of these emotions was similar. The 
authors argue that emotion perception exhibits an immediacy bias in two respects: (a) compared 
with temporally distant emotions, immediate emotions are more salient, thereby making 
immediate emotions appear more intense, and (b) compared with temporally distant emotions, 
people may use the greater availability of information about immediate emotions as a signal of 
greater emotional intensity. In a related work, Van Boven et al. (2007) found that intensity of 
feelings was negatively correlated with perceived psychological distance: the more intensely 
people felt about an event, the lower its perceived psychological distance. In the marketing 
domain, Van den Bergh et al. (2008) and Li (2008) recently observed that exposure to appetitive 
stimuli—such as pictures of women in bikinis shown to heterosexual men or pictures of rich 
desserts and scents of cookies—can lead to increased present orientation in the decision-making 
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process, resulting in greater consumption impatience in unrelated behavioral domains. While 
these studies collectively suggest a close association between affective feelings and a present 
orientation, these studies differ from those reported in the present research in two important 
respects. First, these previous studies focus primarily on how the experience of feelings 
influences the decision maker’s time orientation (a causal chain from feelings to time 
orientation), whereas our research investigates how a given time perspective influences the 
reliance on feelings (a causal chain flowing in the opposite direction: from time orientation to 
feelings). Second, these previous studies focus primarily on the intensity of the feelings (or 
visceral drive) as the causal determinant of time orientation, whereas in our research, the 
intensity of the feelings is held constant across time orientation. Our study focuses on the 
differences in the weight people attach to their feelings across time perspectives rather than on 
differences in intensity (or scale value) across time perspectives. (One could argue that our 
predictions could also be seen from the lenses of construal level theory [Trope and Liberman, 
2003], which has gained increasing popularity in consumer research recently. We shall return to 
this issue in the general discussion.) 
 
Overview of the Experiments 
 
We conducted six experiments involving over 553 participants to test the hypothesis that 
affective feelings are weighted more heavily in judgments and decisions that are set in the 
present than in equivalent judgments and decisions that are set in the future or in the past. In all 
experiments, the main independent variable was the time perspective that participants were 
encouraged to have when making their judgments or decisions. Importantly, the accessibility and 
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intensity of the affective feelings associated with the options were held constant across time 
perspectives. The first four experiments examine the differential reliance on integral and 
incidental affective feelings in decisions set in a near future versus a more distant future. The last 
two experiments examine the differential reliance on incidental affective feelings in evaluations 
set in a recent past versus a more distant past. Experiments 1 and 1B show that in a choice 
between an affectively superior apartment and a cognitively superior apartment, preference for 
the affectively superior apartment is greater in a near future than in a more distant future. 
Consistent with the idea that it is the weight of affect per se that increases in the present 
compared to the future, experiment 2 shows that incidental mood states have stronger mood-
congruent influence on consumers’ intention to rent a given apartment and willingness to pay for 
this apartment if the apartment is to be rented in a near future than if it is to be rented in a more 
distant future. Providing more process-related evidence, experiment 3 shows that consumers find 
the reliance on feelings (as opposed to reasons) more “natural” in decisions set in a near future 
than in decisions set in a more distant future. Whereas the first four experiments examine the 
differential reliance on integral and incidental feelings under a near-future versus distant-future 
perspective, the last two experiments examine the differential reliance on incidental feelings 
under a recent-past versus distant-past perspective. Experiment 4 shows that compared to a more 
distant past, a recent past increases the influence of incidental moods on consumers’ evaluations 
and willingness to pay, suggesting that the greater reliance on feelings in the present applies not 
only compared to the future but also compared to the past. Finally, experiment 5 shows that 
evaluations of a vacation that happened recently are more likely to be influenced by incidental 
moods than by evaluations of a vacation that happened a long time ago, further indicating a 
greater reliance on feelings in the present as compared to the distant past.  
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EXPERIMENT 1: INFLUENCE OF INTEGRAL FEELINGS IN NEAR VERSUS 
DISTANT FUTURE 
 
This experiment tests the basic prediction that consumers are more likely to rely on their 
integral feelings toward the options when the decision horizon involves a near future than when 
it involves a more distant future, even if the accessibility of the feelings is held constant across 
time perspectives. This prediction was tested in the context of a choice between two apartments 
to rent: one that was affectively superior and one that was cognitively (functionally) superior. 
Given this choice set, if an orientation toward the present indeed increases the reliance on 
affective feelings in judgments and decisions, relative preferences for the affectively superior 
apartment should increase. It was therefore predicted that participants choosing between these 
two apartments for the near future would exhibit greater relative preference for the affectively 
superior apartment than participants choosing between these two apartments for a more distant 
future. 
  
Method 
 
Participants and Design. Sixty-one university students (51% women, average age 25.3 
years) were randomly assigned (between-subjects) to either a near-future or a distant-future 
condition. They were paid $5 each for their participation. 
   
Procedure. All participants were asked to imagine that they were about to graduate, had 
found a well-paying job after graduation, and were looking for a one-bedroom apartment to rent 
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after graduation (see appendix A). As a manipulation of time perspective, participants were 
asked to imagine that their graduation would take place either in one month (near-future 
condition) or in a year and one month (distant-future condition), consistent with the university’s 
actual calendar; that is, all participants were asked to assume the same economic reality— 
searching for an apartment after landing a well-paying job just out of college—but for some of 
the participants, this economic reality was set in a near future, whereas for others, this reality was 
set in a more distant future. All participants then reviewed the description of two apartments. 
Each apartment was a one-bedroom apartment; the apartment descriptions contained five 
attributes and included a picture of the apartment’s interior. In addition to the picture, which 
conveyed the apartment’s attractiveness and look, two of the five attributes were expected to 
vary the feelings associated with the apartment: the amount of natural light and the views from 
the apartment. The remaining three attributes were expected to manipulate cognitive or 
functional desirability of the apartment: its monthly rent, its access to public transportation, and 
its size. One apartment, apartment A, was designed to be superior on the cognitive-functional 
dimensions (lower rent, larger square footage, and greater proximity to public transportation); the 
other, apartment B, was designed to be superior on the affective dimensions (better views, more 
sunlight, and more attractive picture). 
As a first dependent measure, participants were asked to rate their relative preference for 
the two apartments on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly prefer apartment A) to 7 (strongly 
prefer apartment B). Higher scores thus indicated a relatively greater preference for the 
affectively superior option. As a second dependent measure, participants were asked to choose 
between the two apartments: A or B. It was predicted that relative preference for and choice of 
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the affectively superior apartment would be greater in the near-future condition than in the 
distant-future condition. 
Various manipulation and confounding checks were then administered. To check for the 
effectiveness of the time perspective manipulation, participants were asked to rate the time 
period on which they focused on two 9-point items anchored at “next month/one year from now” 
and “the very near/very distant future” (α = .82). Participants’ task involvement was assessed on 
three 9-point agree-disagree items (e.g., “I went through the choices as if I was really choosing 
an apartment rental”; α = .87). Participants’ mood states were assessed on five 9-point items 
(e.g., “good/bad,” ‘unpleasant/pleasant”; α = .95). Finally, participants reported basic 
background information, including their proximity to graduation. 
   
Pilot Test. To verify that the stimuli manipulated the affective and cognitive superiority 
of the apartments as intended, an independent group of 42 participants from the same population 
were asked to evaluate the two apartments using specific judgment-process instructions 
developed by Pham et al. (Pham et al. 2001). One group was asked to rate and choose between 
the two apartments based on reason and logical assessment; the other group was asked to rate 
and choose between the two apartments based on feelings. As expected, compared to participants 
instructed to rely on reason and logical assessment, participants instructed to rely on their 
feelings had higher relative preferences for the affectively superior apartment B (3.04 vs. 4.70; 
F(1, 40) = 6.55, p < . 02). They were also more likely to choose apartment B over the cognitively 
superior apartment A (55.0% vs. 13.6%; Z = 3.11, p < .01). These pilot results thus confirm that 
preferences between the two apartments are indeed indicative of differential reliance on feelings 
versus reasons.  
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Results 
 
Preliminary Checks. When prompted, none of the participants correctly guessed the 
hypothesis of the study. As expected, participants reported a significantly greater focus on the 
future in the distant future condition (M = 5.30) than in the near-future condition (M = 3.50; F(1, 
55) = 7.92, p < .01). The time frame manipulation did not influence participants’ level of 
involvement and mood (Fs < 1).  
 
Relative Preference and Choice. As expected, participants’ relative preferences for the 
affectively superior apartment were higher in the near-future condition than the distant-future 
condition (3.45 vs. 2.25; F(1, 55) = 5.85, p < .02; see figure 1A). Participants’ choices exhibited 
a similar pattern. Participants were almost three times more likely to choose the affectively 
superior apartment in the near-future condition (P = 31.01%) than in the distant-future condition 
(31.01% vs. 10.71%; Z = 1.96, p = .05). 
Insert figure 1 about here 
 
Discussion and Replication (Experiment 1B) 
 
Participants given a choice between an affectively superior option and a cognitively 
superior option were found to exhibit stronger relative preference for and choice of the 
affectively superior option if the decision was framed in a near future than if it was framed in a 
distant future; that is, participants appeared to be more influenced by the affective value of the 
options when the decision was set closer to the present than when it was set further in the future.  
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This effect was observed even though the stimuli were identical across time perspectives, and 
therefore the accessibility and intensity of feelings evoked by the two options were presumably 
constant across time perspectives. These results provide initial evidence that consumers’ 
tendency to rely on their integral feelings toward the options in decision making is stronger when 
the time frame of the decision is closer to the present than when it is in a more distant future.  
One potential limitation of this first study is that the manipulation of time perspective was 
somewhat heavy-handed, raising the possibility of demand artifacts (although the demand check 
indicated no evidence of that). To address this issue, this experiment was replicated in a follow-
up experiment (experiment 1B) using a more subtle manipulation of time perspective. Forty-
seven student participants who were actually to graduate in either one month or one year and one 
month were shown the same two apartments as in experiment 1. Prior to assessing their 
preferences and making their choices, they were asked to think about their actual graduation time 
and imagine that they had to choose between the two apartments shortly after graduation. As 
illustrated in figure 1B, the results were almost identical. Participants who were to graduate in 
one month showed greater relative preferences for the affectively superior apartment than those 
who were to graduate the following year (3.20 vs. 1.81; F(1, 45) = 8.92, p < .01). Participants 
who were to graduate in one month also indicated significantly greater relative choice share for 
the affectively superior option than participants who were to graduate the following year 
(30.00% vs. 7.40%; Z = 1.98, p < .05). To gain insight about the process underlying these 
findings, participants were additionally asked to indicate how they made their rental decisions on 
two 7-point agree-disagree items: (a) “I made my decision of which apartment to rent based on 
how I would feel toward living in the apartments” and (b) “I made my decision of which 
apartment to rent based on the logical balance of pros and cons of living in the apartments.” 
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Responses to these two items were averaged into a composite scale where high scores indicated 
greater reliance on feelings to make the rental decision and low scores indicated greater reliance 
on logical assessments. Consistent with the predictions, participants who were to graduate in one 
month indicated having placed marginally greater reliance on feelings (as opposed to logical 
assessments) than participants who were to graduate in 13 months (3.20 vs. 1.63; F(1, 45) = 
3.71, p = .06). This conceptual replication suggests that the effects observed in experiment 1 are 
not only reliable but also unlikely to be due to demand characteristics. Moreover, the process 
results suggest that the greater relative preference for the affectively superior option was driven 
by a greater reliance on feelings as opposed to logical assessments when the time perspective 
was closer to the present.  
 
EXPERIMENT 2: INFLUENCE OF INCIDENTAL FEELINGS IN NEAR VERSUS 
DISTANT FUTURE 
 
Experiments 1 and 1B relied on an integral manipulation of affect toward the options 
(Bodenhausen 1993), which entailed a variation of the information provided across options (see 
Shiv and Fedorikhin [1999] for a similar strategy). One limitation of this design strategy is that—
Experiment 1B’s process results notwithstanding—one cannot be certain that the effects of time 
perspective on preference were really driven by a differential reliance on affect across time 
perspectives as opposed to a differential influence of some other correlates of the affect 
manipulation (e.g., the size of the apartments). To provide further evidence that it is indeed the 
reliance on affect in particular that varies across time perspectives, this second experiment uses 
an incidental manipulation of affect that allows information about the options to be held constant 
(see Pham [1998] for a similar strategy).  
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Given that people often misattribute incidental feelings from preexisting mood states as 
feelings elicited by the target (Schwarz and Clore 1996), consumers should also be more likely to 
rely on incidental, mood-induced feelings in decisions set closer to the present than in decisions 
set in a more distant future. To test this prediction, participants whose mood states were 
manipulated through a supposedly unrelated task were asked to evaluate whether they would rent 
a given apartment after graduating either in the near future or in a more distant future. It was 
expected that participants’ moods would exert a stronger mood-congruent influence in the near-
future condition than in the more-distant-future condition. Given that the focal option remained 
identical across conditions, such a finding would support the interpretation that it is the weight of 
affective feelings per se that varies across time perspectives. Moreover, given that participants’ 
moods were manipulated orthogonally to their time perspectives, such a finding would provide 
additional evidence that the effects of time perspective on the reliance on affect hold even if the 
accessibility of people’s feelings is held constant across time perspectives.  
 
Method 
 
Participants and Design. A total of 104 university students (56% women, average age 
23.3 years) who were paid $7 for their participation were randomly assigned to one of four 
conditions of a 2 (Mood: Positive vs. Negative) × 2 (Time Perspective: Near Future vs. Distant 
Future) between-subjects design.  
 
Procedure. The experiment was administered as two supposedly unrelated studies. In the 
first study, participants’ mood states were manipulated using the same procedure as in Avnet and 
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Pham (2007). Under the pretense of studying people’s ability to comprehend the gist of short 
clips, participants were asked to view and rate two movie clips. The first clip was a neutral 
documentary excerpt that was common across conditions. Its purpose was to neutralize any 
preexisting moods, disguise the mood manipulation introduced in the second clip, and reinforce 
the cover story. In the positive mood condition, the second clip was an excerpt from a Bill Cosby 
stand-up comedy performance. In the negative mood condition, the second clip consisted of 
selected scenes from the movie Lorenzo’s Oil, a movie about a child stricken by a terrible 
disease. After viewing each clip, participants were asked to answer a series of comprehension 
questions designed to reinforce the cover story. Although this manipulation has already been 
tested in previous research (Avnet and Pham 2007), it was further assessed in a separate pretest 
among 50 participants (50% women). After viewing the videos, pretest participants were asked 
to indicate their momentary feelings on six 7-point items (e.g., “unhappy/happy,” “bad/good,” 
“unpleasant/pleasant”; α = .98). As expected, participants who had watched the Lorenzo’s Oil 
video reported feeling less pleasant (M = 2.70) than participants who had watched the Bill 
Cosby’s video (M = 4.89; F(1, 48) = 33.67, p < .0001), confirming the effectiveness of this mood 
manipulation. 
In the supposedly unrelated second study, participants were shown the description of a 
single apartment and were asked to assess whether they would rent it after graduation. The 
described apartment was the same as the affectively superior apartment (apartment B) in 
experiment 1. Participants’ time perspective (near future or distant future) was manipulated in 
the same way as in experiment 1. As the main dependent measures, participants rated their 
intention to rent this apartment after graduation on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (definitely not 
rent) to 9 (definitely rent) and indicated how much monthly rent they would be willing to pay for 
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this apartment. The same manipulation and confounding checks as in experiment 1 were then 
collected, along with some background information. 
 
Results 
 
Preliminary Checks. Again, when prompted, none of the participants correctly guessed 
the hypothesis of the study. As expected, participants indicated greater future-orientation in the 
distant future condition (M = 6.36) than in the near future condition (M = 4.17; F(1, 103) = 
20.86, p < .0001). All other effects were nonsignificant (Fs < 1). In addition, participants’ levels 
of involvement did not differ across conditions (all Fs < 1). 
 
Behavioral Intention and Willingness to Pay. If proximity to the present encourages the 
reliance on feelings in judgments and decisions, evaluations should be more influenced by 
incidental mood states if performed under a near-future time perspective than if performed under 
a distant-future time perspective. Consistent with this prediction, participants’ intentions to rent 
the apartment exhibited a significant Mood × Time perspective interaction (F(1, 103) = 5.93, p < 
.02; see figure 2). Simple-effect tests showed that participants’ mood states had a significant 
mood-congruent effect on their intentions in the near-future condition (MPositive = 5.28 vs. 
MNegative = 3.72; F(1, 103) = 7.14, p < .01) but not in the distant-future condition (F < 1). This is 
consistent with the idea that feelings that are (here, mistakenly) attributed to the target are 
weighted more heavily in decisions that are set closer to the present than in identical decisions 
set in a more distant future. (Neither of the main effects approached significance: both ps > .14). 
Insert figure 2 about here 
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Participants’ willingness to pay for rent exhibited a similar pattern. A significant Time 
Perspective × Mood interaction (F(1, 103) = 4.94, p < .03) showed that participants’ moods had 
a stronger mood-congruent influence on their willingness to pay in the near-future condition 
(MPositive = $1,916 vs. MNegative = $1,589; F(1, 103) = 5.35, p < .03) than in the distant-future 
condition (MPositive = $1,721 vs. MNegative = $1,840; F < 1). Main effects of time perspective and 
mood again were nonsignificant (both ps > .30). 
 
Discussion 
 
Experiment 2 provides additional evidence that consumers whose time perspectives are 
closer to the present are more likely to rely on their feelings to make judgments and decisions 
than consumers whose time perspectives are set in a more distant future. This effect occurs even 
when (a) the feelings are in fact incidental to the target because people often mistake such 
feelings as genuine integral feelings toward the target and (b) the target of evaluation and its 
associated information are held constant. This experiment confirms that it is indeed the weight of 
affective feelings that increases when decisions are set closer to the present. In addition, given 
that participants’ moods were manipulated independently of their time perspectives, the 
experiment shows again that this phenomenon occurs even if the accessibility of the feelings is 
held constant across time perspectives.  
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EXPERIMENT 3: NATURALNESS OF FEELING-BASED VERSUS REASON-BASED 
JUDGMENT IN NEAR VERSUS DISTANT FUTURE 
 
This experiment attempts to provide further process evidence for the proposed 
explanation of the first two experiments’ findings. Participants whose time perspectives were 
manipulated as in the previous experiments were asked to choose between the same two 
apartments as in experiment 1. Unlike in previous experiments, participants were instructed to 
follow a specific judgment process to make their choice. They were instructed to use either a 
feeling-based process or a reason-based process. It was expected that a feeling-based process 
would be easier to adopt under a near-future time perspective than under a more distant-future 
time perspective. This is because we hypothesize an inherent affinity between a present time 
orientation and a reliance on feelings in judgment. In contrast, a reason-based process should be 
equally easy (or difficult) to adopt regardless of time perspectives. This is because cognitive 
modes of judgment should be more atemporal (Pham 2004). Therefore the pattern of results was 
expected to suggest that the spontaneous reliance on feelings was inherently more natural in the 
present than in the future.  
 
Method 
 
Participants and Design. Sixty-four university students (58% women, average age 24.3 
years) were randomly assigned (between subjects) to either a feeling-based process condition or 
a reason-based process condition. They were additionally categorized as either near-future 
oriented if their anticipated graduation was in a few weeks or distant-future oriented if their 
anticipated graduation was the following year.  
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Procedure. Participants were asked to evaluate the same two apartments as in experiment 
1 as potential rental options after they graduate from college. The procedure was similar to that 
of experiment 1 with two important differences. First, instead of manipulating time perspective 
by asking participants to assume a given time of graduation, participants were asked to think 
about their actual time of graduation, as in experiment 1B. Half the participants were about to 
graduate in a few weeks; the other half expected to graduate in the following year. Second, 
instead of being allowed to use whatever process they wanted to make their decisions, 
participants were asked to follow a specific judgment process. Consistent with the procedures 
validated by Pham et al. (2001), half the participants received detailed feeling-based instructions, 
encouraging them to make their decisions based on how they would feel toward living in each 
apartment; the other half received reason-based instructions, encouraging them to make their 
decisions based on reason and logical arguments about living in each apartment. After reading 
these process instructions and reviewing the descriptions of the same two apartments as in 
experiment 1, participants were administered the same dependent measures as in experiment 1. 
First, they rated their relative preference for the two apartments on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 
(strongly prefer apartment A) to 7 (strongly prefer apartment B). Higher scores again indicated 
greater preference for the affectively superior option. Next, they indicated their choice between 
the two apartments (A or B). As a process measure, participants were asked to describe how they 
made their decision by rating their agreement with two items: (a) “I made my decision of which 
apartment to rent based on how I would feel toward living in the apartments” and (b) “I made my 
decision of which apartment to rent based on the logical balance of pros and cons of living in the 
apartments.”  
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Participants were categorized as near-future oriented or distant-future oriented based on 
their anticipated year of graduation, which they were asked to indicate at the end of the study: 
either in a few weeks (in 2008) or the following year (in 2009).  
 
Results  
 
Relative Preference and Choice. Participants’ relative preferences for the two apartments 
revealed a predictable main effect of process instruction, whereby feeling-based instructions 
promoted greater relative preferences for the affectively superior apartment than reason-based 
instructions (3.92 vs. 2.80; F(1, 60) = 4.61, p < .05). In addition, consistent with the results of 
experiments 1 and 1B, a marginally significant main effect of time perspective (F(1, 60) = 2.87, 
p < .10) indicated that closer proximity to graduation resulted in slightly greater relative 
preferences for the affectively superior apartment (3.80 vs. 2.92). (That this effect was only 
marginally significant is not surprising given that, unlike in experiment 1, in this study 
participants were instructed to follow a specific judgment process that need not have coincided 
with the process they would naturally follow.)  
More important, these main effects were qualified by a significant interaction between 
time perspective and process instructions (F(1, 60) = 7.44, p < .01). As illustrated in figure 3, 
among participants who were to graduate in a few weeks, preference for the affectively superior 
option was stronger if they were instructed to rely on their feelings (M = 5.07) than if they were 
instructed to rely on their reasons (M = 2.53; F(1, 60) = 11.88, p < .005). In other words, when 
decisions are set closer to the present, people can readily rely on their feelings if they are asked 
to. However, among participants who were to graduate only in a year, preferences were 
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comparably skewed toward the cognitively superior option, whether participants were explicitly 
instructed to rely on their feelings (M = 2.76) or were instructed to rely on their reasons (M = 
3.07, F < 1). This interaction suggests that it is more difficult (or less natural) to rely on feelings 
in decisions set in a more distant future than in decisions set closer to the present.  
Insert figure 3 about here 
 
Judgment Process. A composite process measure was created by taking the difference 
between the degree to which participants stated that they relied on their feelings toward the 
apartments to make their decisions and the degree to which they stated that they relied on the 
balance of pros and cons of the apartments. As in experiment 1B, a higher score on this measure 
indicated greater relative reliance on feelings versus reasons. As expected, participants reported 
greater reliance on feelings (vs. reasons) in the feeling-instructions condition than in the reason-
instructions condition (–.48 vs. –2.25; F(1, 60) = 5.49, p < .03), confirming that the process 
instructions were effective. More important, participants also reported greater reliance on 
feelings (vs. reasons) if their graduation was close than if their graduation was more distant (–.42 
vs. –2.31; F(1, 60) = 6.25, p < .02). This main effect of time perspective on the process that 
participants used to make their decisions is consistent with the proposition that reliance on affect 
is more natural in decisions that are closer to the present than in decisions that are more distant. 
Interestingly, there was no interaction between process instructions and time perspectives (F(1, 
60) = 1.11, p = .30), suggesting that process instructions and time perspectives had additive 
effects on participants’ self-reported reliance on feelings.  
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Discussion 
 
This experiment provides two types of evidence consistent with the hypothesis that 
reliance on affect is greater in judgments and decisions that are set closer to the present than in 
those that are set in a more distant future. First, it was found that participants whose natural time 
perspectives were closer to the present indeed exhibited stronger preference for the affectively 
superior option if instructed to rely on their feelings than if instructed to rely on their reasons. In 
contrast, participants whose natural time perspectives were of a more distant future exhibited 
preferences that were comparably skewed toward the cognitively superior option regardless of 
whether they were instructed to rely on their feelings or their reasons. This interaction suggests 
that whereas people can readily rely on their feelings when the decision is set closer to the 
present, reliance on feelings is more difficult when the decision is set in a more distant future. In 
addition, participants spontaneously reported placing greater reliance on their feelings when the 
decision involved a near future than when it involved a more distant future. Therefore the 
reliance on feelings appears to be more natural in decisions set near the present than in decisions 
set in a more distant future.  
 
EXPERIMENT 4: INFLUENCE OF INCIDENTAL FEELINGS IN RECENT VERSUS 
DISTANT PAST 
 
The first three experiments examined the differential influence of (reliance on) feelings in 
a near future compared to a distant future. If the affective system is inherently a decision system 
of the present, parallel effects should be observed when comparing the influence of feelings 
under a recent past time frame versus a distant past time frame. As in experiment 2, we 
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investigated this issue by using an incidental mood manipulation of affective feelings. To 
generalize the previous experiments’ findings to a different decision domain, this experiment 
examined this issue in the context of evaluations of video games. If proximity to the present 
promotes a greater reliance on feelings as inputs to judgments and decisions, consumers’ 
incidental mood states should exert a stronger mood-congruent influence on evaluations of video 
games appraised with a recent-past perspective than on evaluations of video games appraised 
with a distant-past perspective. A parallel moderation of recent versus distant past on the reliance 
on feelings would further differentiate our main theoretical proposition from previous findings 
suggesting that affect promotes impatience. 
 
Method 
 
Participants and Design. A total of 103 university students (51% women, average age 
22.9 years) who received $5 for their participation were randomly assigned to one of four 
conditions of a 2 (Mood: Positive vs. Negative) × 2 (Time Perspective: Recent Past vs. Distant 
Past) between-subjects design.  
 
Procedure. The experiment was administered as two supposedly unrelated studies. In the 
first study, participants’ moods were manipulated using the same Avnet and Pham (2007) 
procedure as in experiment 2. The supposedly unrelated second study was allegedly about 
consumers’ evaluations of various media. Participants were told that the researchers were 
interested in participants’ evaluations of a team of video game designers based on a selection of 
games the team had developed. All participants were asked to evaluate the same set of video 
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games: Pong, Combat, and Duck Hunt. Each game was illustrated by a screenshot and a brief 
description of the game. To trigger different time perspectives, participants in the recent-past 
condition were told that the “games were created, developed, and released recently . . . since 
2007,” whereas participants in the distant-past condition were told that the “games were created, 
developed, and released in the past . . . in the early 1980s” (emphasis added). The various 
games’ screenshots and ostensible release dates were also varied, with sharper graphics and more 
recent release dates in the recent-past condition than in the distant-past condition (see appendix 
B). The rest of the information was identical across conditions. As the main dependent measure, 
participants were asked to evaluate the selection of games produced by the team on five 7-point 
scales such as “These games are good/not good,” “I find the games uninteresting/interesting,” 
and “I like/do not like the games they developed” (α = .92). Additional confounding, 
manipulation, and demand checks were collected: (a) levels of involvement on four agree-
disagree items such as “I found the task of evaluating these games very interesting” (α = .79); (b) 
moods after watching the video clips on five 7-point items such as “bad/good” (α = .94); and (c) 
guesses of the purpose of the study. Finally, participants reported basic background information 
such as age and gender.  
 
Pilot Test. To verify that the video game stimuli triggered different past time 
perspectives, an independent group of 50 participants (50% women) was asked to evaluate the 
same three video games based on the same descriptions as in the main study (appendix B). As a 
manipulation check, participants rated whether they thought the games were released recently or 
a long time ago on three 7-point items (e.g., “the very recent past/the very distant past,” “not that 
long ago/a long time ago”; α = .74). In addition, they described the time periods on which they 
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focused when assessing the video games on another three 7-point items (e.g., “about 20 years 
ago/about 2 years ago,” “the very distant past/the very recent past”; α = .89). Compared to 
participants in the distant-past condition, participants in the recent-past condition indeed thought 
the games were developed and released more recently (2.60 vs. 3.43; F(1, 48) = 5.62, p < . 03). 
In addition, participants in the recent-past condition reported focusing on a more recent time 
period (M = 4.54) when evaluating the games compared to participants in the distant past 
condition (M = 2.84; F(1, 48) = 21.61, p < . 0001). These pilot test results confirm that the 
stimuli did trigger different past perspectives. 
 
Results 
 
Preliminary Checks. Data from three participants who did not watch the mood-inducing 
videos and two participants who suspected a relationship between the two ostensibly unrelated 
studies were removed, leaving 98 observations. As expected, participants reported feeling more 
pleasant in the positive mood condition (M = 5.05) than in the negative mood condition (M = 
3.52; F(1, 94) = 32.83, p < .0001). There were no other effects of the manipulations on self-
reported mood (ps > .22). In addition, participants’ level of involvement in the study did not 
differ across the conditions (all ps > .16).  
 
Evaluation of Video Games. Participants evaluated the games more favorably when led to 
believe that the games were created in the early 1980s (M = 5.21) than when led to believe that 
the games were created more recently (M = 3.42; F(1, 94) = 46.08, p < .0001), suggesting higher 
expectations from video games that were ostensibly more recent. In addition, evaluations were 
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more favorable in the positive-mood condition (M = 4.70) than in the negative-mood condition 
(M = 3.97; F(1, 94) = 7.93, p < .01), consistent with previous mood-congruent evaluation 
findings. More central to this research, this main effect of mood was again qualified by an 
interaction with time perspective (F(1, 94) = 4.11, p < .05). As illustrated in figure 4, participants 
who were primed to adopt a more recent-past perspective gave significantly higher evaluations 
of the games if they were in a positive mood (M = 4.06) than if they were in a negative mood (M 
= 2.78; F(1, 94) = 11.49, p < .001), suggesting that they relied on their momentary feelings as an 
input to their evaluations. In contrast, participants who were prompted to adopt a more distant-
past perspective gave comparable evaluations of the games regardless of their moods (5.31 vs. 
5.10; F < 1), suggesting that they did not incorporate their momentary feelings into their 
evaluations. Once more, this pattern of results was observed despite the fact that participants’ 
feelings after watching the mood-inducing clips were presumably the same whether they were in 
the distant-past condition or in the recent-past condition. This is again consistent with the 
hypothesis that consumers place greater weight on their momentary feelings in judgments and 
decisions with a time perspective closer to the present than in judgments and decisions with a 
time perspective that is more distant. 
Insert figure 4 about here 
 
Alternative Explanation. One could argue that the absence of mood effect in the distant-
past condition may have been due to a ceiling effect in this condition. This alternative 
explanation seems unlikely because a reanalysis of the data using the method of successive 
intervals, which is largely insensitive to floor and ceiling effects (Edwards and Thurstone 1952; 
Schwarz et al. 1987), uncovered essentially identical results: the simple effect of mood in the 
distant past condition remained nonsignificant (p = .57).  
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Discussion 
 
This experiment converges with and extends the previous experiments’ findings in two 
ways. First, it tests the basic hypothesis in a different domain: that of evaluations of video games 
as opposed to evaluations of apartment rentals. More important, whereas the first three 
experiments document the influence of different prospective time horizons on the reliance on 
feelings in judgments and decisions, this experiment documents a parallel influence of different 
retrospective time horizons. Paralleling the results of experiment 2, evaluations of the video 
games exhibited significant interaction between participants’ moods and participants’ 
(retrospective) time perspectives. Participants’ moods were more influential among those who 
were encouraged to adopt a more recent-past perspective than among those who were 
encouraged to adopt a more distant-past perspective. This finding is again consistent with the 
idea that proximity to the present encourages the reliance on feelings in judgments and decision 
making even if the accessibility and intensity of the feelings are held constant across time 
perspectives.  
 
EXPERIMENT 5: INFLUENCE OF INCIDENTAL FEELINGS IN RECENT VERSUS 
DISTANT PAST 
 
The purpose of this final experiment was to conceptually replicate the findings of 
experiment 4 and extend them to the domain of evaluations of personal experiences (as opposed 
to external products). Student participants were first asked to describe a spring break vacation 
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from either a recent past or a distant past. Their incidental feelings were next manipulated 
through an ostensibly unrelated task. Participants were then asked to evaluate the spring break 
vacation they had just described. If compared to a distant past perspective, a more recent past 
perspective increases the reliance on incidental feelings, participants’ moods should have 
stronger influence on their evaluations of a recent spring break than on their evaluation of a 
distant past spring break.  
 
Method 
 
Participants and Design. Eighty-two university students (51% women, average age 24.3 
years) who were paid $8 were randomly assigned to one of four conditions of a 2 (Mood: 
Positive vs. Negative) × 2 (Time-Perspective: Recent Past vs. Distant Past) between-subjects 
design.  
  
Procedure. The alleged purpose of the study was to understand how well people can 
remember significant events in their lives. All participants were asked to recall and describe a 
past spring break vacation. Participants in the recent-past condition were asked to recall and 
describe the spring break vacation that happened a few weeks earlier, whereas those in the 
distant-past condition were asked to recall and describe the spring break vacation that happened 
two years earlier. All participants were instructed to provide a description between 130 and 180 
words, which a pretest had shown to be a sensible length for such descriptions. The purpose of 
requesting descriptions of a specific length was to standardize the level of detail of the memories 
participants described across time perspective conditions.  
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Participants were then told that they would be given a distracter task before answering 
additional questions about the described spring break. The distracter task was in fact the Avnet 
and Pham (2007) movie-based mood manipulation also used in experiments 2 and 4. The 
purpose of administering the mood manipulation after participants had described their spring 
vacations was to reduce the possibility that any effect of mood on evaluations could be due to 
mood-congruent recall (Isen et al. 1978). After their moods were manipulated, participants were 
presented with the spring break vacation descriptions that they had written earlier. They were 
asked to review their vacation descriptions and evaluate the vacations on seven 7-point items 
(e.g., “I did not have/I had a good time,” “It was disappointing/gratifying”; α = .97), which were 
averaged into an overall evaluation of the vacation and formed the main dependent measure. 
Again, several manipulation and confounding checks were collected. To verify that 
participants had different time perspectives, they were asked to rate on three 7-point items 
whether they thought about the situation as something that happened recently or a long time ago 
(e.g., “very recent past/very distant past,” “just happened/long time ago”; α = .93). To check the 
effectiveness of mood manipulation, participants were asked to rate their feelings after watching 
the critical video on five 7-point items (e.g., “bad/good,” “unpleasant/pleasant”; α =.97). Level of 
involvement was measured by two 7-point agree-disagree items: “I tried as hard as I can to recall 
the details of my past spring break vacation” and “I thought about my past spring vacation very 
carefully” (α = .77). A demand check was also included, along with some basic demographic 
assessments. 
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Results 
 
Preliminary Checks. When asked, none of the participants correctly guessed the 
hypothesis of the study. As expected, participants’ subjective time perspectives were more past 
oriented in the distant-past condition than in the recent-past condition (4.36 vs. 3.31; F(1, 78) = 
6.18, p < .02). Interestingly, a main effect of mood also indicated that the recalled spring break 
seemed more recent in the positive mood condition than in the negative mood condition (3.34 vs. 
4.33; F(1, 78) = 5.40, p < .05). There interaction between time perspective and mood was not 
significant (F < 1). Also, as expected, participants reported feeling more pleasant after watching 
Bill Cosby’s standup comedy (M = 5.38) than after watching scenes from Lorenzo’s Oil (5.38 vs. 
2.57; F(1, 78) = 90.27, p < .0001). Other effects were not significant (ps > .11). Finally, there 
were no main or interaction effects of the manipulations on reported levels of involvement (all ps 
> .14).  
To control for heterogeneity in participants’ spring break experiences, two independent 
coders (who were blind to the experimental hypothesis) coded participants’ descriptions into one 
of three categories: (a) “went somewhere for spring break” (59.03%), (b) “stayed at home for 
spring break” (26.51%), and (c) “worked during spring break” (14.46%; κ = 0.87, disagreement 
resolved by a third independent rater). Because this categorical measure was understandably 
correlated with participants’ evaluations of their spring breaks (F(2, 80) = 14.40, p < .0001), it 
was controlled for as a covariate in the main analyses.  
  
Evaluation of Overall Spring Break. Participants’ overall evaluation of their past spring 
break was submitted to a 2 (Time Perspective) × 2 (Mood) ANCOVA with a covariate 
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controlling for how participants occupied the spring break. The analysis uncovered no main 
effects of time perspective or mood (ps > .23). Verifying the main predictions of this experiment, 
results showed a significant Time Perspective × Mood interaction (F(1, 76) = 4.21, p < .05). As 
illustrated in figure 5, participants’ moods had a stronger mood-congruent influence on their 
evaluations of the more recent spring break (MPositive = 5.87 vs. MNegative = 4.78; F(1, 76) = 4.28, p 
< .05) than on their evaluations of the more distant spring break (MPositive = 4.72 vs. MNegative = 
5.03; F < 1). Therefore participants appeared to rely more on their momentary feelings as 
information when evaluating a recent spring break but not when evaluating an earlier spring 
break. This is consistent with the hypothesis that people place greater weight on their feelings as 
informational inputs when making evaluations and decisions whose time perspective is closer to 
the present as opposed to set in a more distant past.  
Insert figure 5 about here 
 
Discussion 
 
Experiment 5’s results converge with those of experiment 4 in supporting the prediction 
that a more recent past perspective increases the reliance on feelings in evaluations compared to 
a more distant past perspective. Whereas in experiment 4, this effect was observed with an 
external target object (video games), in this experiment, the effect was observed with an 
autobiographical experience. The specificity of the observed pattern of findings and the high 
convergence of results between these two experiments despite their very different 
operationalizations place strong constraints on possible alternative explanations. For example, it 
seems unlikely that the results were due to mood-congruent recall. First, in this experiment, 
mood was manipulated after participants were asked to recall and describe their experiences. 
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Second, in experiment 4, there was fairly little for participants to recall as the target information 
(about the video game) was externally provided. More important, it is difficult to see why mood-
congruent recall would operate more when the experience or external target is recent than when 
it is more distant. An affect-as-information explanation can account for such an interaction more 
easily (Pham 1998; Schwarz and Clore 1983). More generally, the parallel evaluative effects of 
moods in recent pasts and near futures compared to distant pasts and distant futures support the 
hypothesis that consumers make greater reliance on their momentary feelings in judgments and 
decisions that are closer to the present, whether they are looking forward or backward in time. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Building on previous empirical findings that affect-based decisions tend to be more 
myopic than reason-based decisions (Loewenstein 1996; Metcalfe and Mischel 1999), it has been 
speculated that affect is inherently a decision-making system of the present (Pham 2004, 2007). 
This research provides an initial attempt to verify this theoretical claim. We propose that the 
entire affective system is indeed more likely to be engaged in judgments and decisions set in the 
present than in judgments and decisions set either in the future or in the past. One aspect of this 
engagement is the reliance on feelings as inputs in judgments and decisions. The present set of 
studies tested the specific hypothesis that, as a result of the greater engagement of the affective 
system in the present, consumers are more likely to rely on their feelings in judgments and 
decisions set in the present than in comparable judgments and decisions set in the future or in the 
past. This occurs even when accessibility of feelings is held across time horizons. 
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Consistent support for this hypothesis was found across five experiments and one 
conceptual replication. It was found in experiments 1 and 1B that integral affect toward choice 
options plays a greater role if the decision is set in a near future than if it is set in a more distant 
future. The same phenomenon was observed in experiment 2 with incidental feelings. Incidental 
mood states exerted a stronger mood-congruent influence on behavioral intentions and 
willingness to pay when a near-future perspective was adopted than when a distant-future 
perspective was adopted. This is consistent with the idea that consumers are more likely to rely 
on their momentary affective feelings as inputs when judgments and decisions are set closer to 
the present than when they are set in the future. The process-focused findings of experiment 3 
converge with this interpretation. Whereas participants who were explicitly instructed to rely on 
reason and logical assessment to make their decisions were equally likely to do so under a near-
future perspective as under a distant-future perspective, participants who were instructed to rely 
on their feelings were much more likely to do so under a near-future perspective than under a 
distant-future perspective. This finding suggests that the reliance on feelings is more natural 
when the time perspective is closer to the present than when the time perspective is set in the 
distant future. Finally, results from experiments 4 and 5 suggest that the greater reliance on 
feelings in judgments and decisions that are anchored in the present also hold in comparison to 
the past. Incidental mood states were found to exert a stronger mood-congruent influence on 
evaluations of a product and past personal experiences among participants who were encouraged 
to adopt a more recent-past perspective than among those who were encouraged to adopt a more 
distant-past perspective.  
These results appear to be robust and rather general. They were observed in three 
different decision domains—evaluations of apartments (experiments 1–3), evaluations of video 
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games (experiment 4), and evaluations of past vacations (experiment 5)—with both integral 
feelings evoked by the options (experiments 1–3) and incidental feelings arising from preexisting 
mood states (Experiments 2, 4, and 5). Moreover, the effects were observed both when 
comparing near futures to distant futures and when comparing recent pasts to distant pasts.  
It is important to note that in all these experiments, the accessibility and intensity of 
feelings were held constant across time perspectives. This suggests that while an important 
aspect of the present-orientation of the affective system is the myopia that results from the 
differential accessibility and intensity of feelings experienced in the present versus imagined in 
the future (Loewenstein 1996), this myopia induced by differential accessibility of feelings is not 
the only way in which the affective system is inherently present oriented. Not only are feelings 
more intense and accessible in the present than in the future (or past), but they are also weighted 
more heavily in the present than in the future (or past). Taking into account these findings and 
other recent findings documenting a close association between affective feelings and present 
orientation, this suggests that the association between time (or more generally, psychological 
distance) and affective feelings may be overgeneralized: a present orientation may skew 
judgments toward heavier weighting of affective information, and affective cues may skew 
judgments toward a present orientation. Again, both effects—whether a present orientation 
leading to greater weighting of feelings or intensely experienced affective feelings leading to 
present orientation—can be considered consequences of a greater engagement of the affective 
system in the present. 
It is interesting to relate the current research to construal level theory. On one hand, one 
could argue that this research is consistent with construal level theory if one assumes that 
affective feelings tend to be more concrete and low level than cognitive beliefs and reasons 
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(Epstein and Pacini 1999; Metcalfe and Mischel 1999). On the other hand, one could also argue 
that our results are inconsistent with construal level theory if one assumes that affective values, 
such as the aesthetic of an apartment, speak to the desirability of the options, whereas cognitive 
values, such as the apartment’s rent or distance to public transportation, speak to the feasibility 
of the options. Recall that in experiments 1, 1B, and 3, proximity to the present was found to 
increase the influence of the apartments’ affective value (and decrease the influence of their 
cognitive value), whereas according to construal level theory, proximity should increase the 
weight of feasibility considerations and decrease the weight of desirability (Trope and Liberman 
2000). Therefore, when do predictions based on the current research and those of construal level 
theory align? When do they diverge? One conjecture is that time perspective may influence 
representation of the decision problem along (at least) two dimensions: (a) an affective/cognitive 
dimension, as suggested by the present research, and (b) a desirability/feasibility dimension, as 
suggested by construal level theory. These two dimensions may be orthogonal and do not 
necessarily have a one-to-one correspondence. Depending on the choice situation, differences 
along one dimension may exert a relatively greater influence on consumer decisions across time 
orientations. The design of experiments 1 and 1B, for instance, involves affective and cognitive 
features that belong mostly to the same type of consideration (e.g., desirability). (The 
hypothetical scenario used in experiment 1 was designed to downplay participants’ potential 
concern for rental price, which likely lies along the feasibility dimension. Participants were 
asked to imagine that they had found a well-paying job in the apartment rental scenario.) Size of 
the apartment is a relatively more cognitive feature, whereas view from the apartment is a 
relatively more affective feature, yet both are considered desirable attributes. In this situation, 
differences in affective-cognitive dimension should exert greater effect on consumer decisions. 
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There may be other choice situations that involve trade-offs between desirability and feasibility 
concerns while holding the type of valence (affective or cognitive) constant. In this situation, 
predictions based on construal level theory should prevail.  
The current research offers novel predictions in certain decision contexts that cannot be 
explained solely by previous models such as construal level theory and explanations based on 
differential accessibility and intensity of feelings. For instance, it is not obvious how a different 
construal explanation would apply when participants were evaluating the same explicit external 
stimuli across time perspectives, as in experiments 1–3. In addition, construal level theory does 
not seem to account very well for recent neuroscientific findings suggesting an intimate 
connection between affect and the present (e.g., McClure et al. 2004). Our hypothesis suggests 
that one reason affect is closely associated with the present is that people give different 
weighting to affective and cognitive information across time orientations, and do so even under 
the same mental representation of the target object.  
Our explanation based on differential weighting of affective feelings also makes unique 
predictions beyond Loewenstein’s (1996) explanation based on differential accessibility–
intensity of feelings. We suggest that consumers are more likely to rely on their feelings for 
imminent decisions than for temporally more distant decisions, even when they have the same 
phenomenal experiences about decisions across time; that is, self-control is difficult not only 
because people experience affective feelings more intensely for temporally imminent decisions 
than for temporally remote decisions but also because, holding the intensity of their feelings 
constant, people are more likely to rely on their feelings in decisions that are imminent. 
Moreover, the fact that similar effects occur when comparing judgments anchored on recent 
versus distant pasts (experiments 4 and 5) suggests that our findings cannot be easily accounted 
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for by standard conceptualizations based on time discounting and impatience, which are 
necessarily forward looking.  
If the affective system is indeed more engaged in the present than it is in the future or 
past, other judgmental correlates of the engagement of affect should be more pronounced in the 
present than in the future or past. For example, a number of studies have documented that 
valuation judgments based on affect tend to be more insensitive to the quantitative scope or 
magnitude of the evaluated stimulus than valuation judgments based on cognitive computational 
processes (Dunn and Ashton-James 2008; Hsee and Rottenstreich 2004), a phenomenon known 
as the scope-insensitivity bias. In a companion paper (Chang and Pham 2009), we found that the 
scope-insensitivity bias that is typical of affective valuation is indeed more pronounced in the 
present than in either the future or the past. This finding is further evidence that affect is 
inherently a decision-making system of the present.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
Imagine that you are about to graduate next month [next year], after years of hard work in college, and 
that you have accepted a well-paying job in the city. You have been looking forward to this day, which will be in 
May 2007 [May 2008], envisioning how life would be like after your college graduation. In just a month [year], you 
will be starting a new chapter in your life.  
As your graduation is approaching next month [next year], you begin your apartment search process, 
looking for a one-bedroom apartment to rent after your graduation. You are considering the following two 
apartments that will be available by the time you graduate from college next month [next year]:  
  
 
 
Apartment A 
 
 
Apartment B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Characteristics of Apartment A: 
 Partial courtyard view 
 Single window in living room and small 
window in bedroom 
 Spacious closet space 
 630 sq. ft. 
 Steps from the subway  
 Monthly rent: $1,600 
 
Characteristics of Apartment B: 
 Breathtaking view from most rooms 
 Oversized windows with lots of sunlight 
 Limited closet space 
 450 sq. ft. 
 Four bus stops from the subway 
 Monthly rent: $2,300 
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FIGURE 1 
EFFECT OF TIME PERSPECTIVE ON RELATIVE PREFERENCE FOR AND CHOICE OF 
AFFECTIVELY SUPERIOR OPTION (EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 1B) 
 
(A) EXPERIMENT 1 (N = 61) 
        
 
(B) EXPERIMENT 1B (N = 47) 
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FIGURE 2 
EFFECT OF TIME PERSPECTIVE AND MOOD ON INTENTION TO RENT AND 
WILLINGNESS TO PAY (EXPERIMENT 2; N = 104)  
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FIGURE 3 
EFFECT OF TIME OF GRADUATION AND PROCESS INSTRUCTIONS ON RELATIVE 
PREFERENCE FOR AFFECTIVELY SUPERIOR OPTION  (EXPERIMENT 3; N = 64) 
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FIGURE 4 
EFFECT OF TIME PERSPECTIVE AND MOOD ON VIDEO GAME EVALUATIONS  
(EXPERIMENT 4; N = 98) 
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FIGURE 5 
EFFECT OF TIME PERSPECTIVE AND MOOD ON EVALUATION OF SPRING BREAK  
(EXPERIMENT 5; N = 98) 
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